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Abstract
Should a subset of member states of a federation be allowed to form a sub-union on some
policy issue? When centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced
cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter to gain benefits which
would otherwise be lost. However, if in the future the excluded countries also want to join,
the fact that a sub-union has been formed in the past may change the status quo to the
advantage of the first comers. We show that as long as countries can commit to harmonize at
a policy which also takes into account the utility of the excluded country, sub-union formation
may be optimal. The relative advantage of a sub-union towards centralization increases when
transfers are costly. On the other hand, if commitment is not possible then excluded countries
may be penalized. We use these results to discuss of the newly introduced rules for enhanced
cooperation agreements in the European Union, suggesting that they might lead to increased
centralization.
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Should a subset of the member states of a federation be allowed to get along with further
cooperation on particular issues? Which trade-o®s are involved in letting them do so?
How should the federal institutions be organized to deal e®ectively with sub-unions of
states?
In a static framework, the answers are straightforward. Sub-unions should be al-
lowed if they do not damage the other members of the federation, or if the resulting
negative externalities can be compensated for. They should be prohibited otherwise.
Governance of such agreements also appears straightforward. When there are no neg-
ative externalities, members of the sub-union should be allowed to set the policies as
they prefer, with no interference from the other members of the federation. Otherwise,
1policies and compensations for externalities should be jointly discussed and approved
by all countries in the federation.
Things become more complicated if we move to a dynamic framework. Political
conveniences may change over time in ways which cannot be precisely predicted today.
A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,e v e ni fas u b - u n i o nd o e sn o td a m a g et h eo t h e rm e m b e r so ft h e
federation today, it might do so in the future. For example, the countries outside
the sub-union may contemplate joining it in the future, say because cooperation on
that particular issue turns out to be convenient ex post. Then, even if there are no
negative externalities from the sub-union at the present or in the future, the fact that
a sub-union has already been established in the past may change the status quo to the
advantage of the ¯rst-comers. In this case, cooperation may occur at worse terms for
the late-comers than it would do if the sub-union had been prohibited to start with.
This suggests that one important trade-o® in letting sub-unions to be formed is
between the increased welfare for the countries joining immediately the sub-union and
the expected losses for the other countries in future periods, if the latter also end up
joining the sub-union. Furthermore, this also suggests that the optimal governance
structure for the sub-unions is far from trivial. For example, it might make sense to
allow countries which decide to opt out the sub-union at the beginning to retain some
decision power on the sub-union itself. Rules about who can join in the future the
sub-union, and at what conditions, also appear to be crucial.
These theoretical considerations may play an important role in many real world
cases. An example is given by international trade agreements, such as the Nafta Treaty.
Here the issue is whether countries should be allowed to further remove trade barriers
through bilateral agreements or if only multilateral agreements involving all countries
should be allowed (see Levy, 1997). Other examples are given by the enforcement of
policies at local levels, when a policy can be adopted at di®erent times by di®erent
local governments. The most salient example however is the European Union (EU).
The EU has reached a point at which the heterogeneity among its members is so large
to make it di±cult to ¯nd common policies which would be bene¯cial for all members,
and the incoming EU enlargement is bound to make things worse. Yet, there are
still clearly many ¯elds where further policy integration could bene¯t at least some
subsets of EU members, and might in the future bene¯t all of them if these cooperative
agreements turn out to be successful. Traditionally, the EU has coped with these
con°icting needs in an ad hoc way, looking for intergovernmental agreements which
allowed some of the members to go on with further integration while others could `opt
out', at least temporarily. The European Monetary Union and the Shengen treaty are
the best known examples of this strategy. In many cases, however, this strategy failed
to work entirely. The growing dissatisfaction with this state of a®airs led the current
EU members to agree on the introduction of well de¯ned procedures to allow for subsets
of members to go on with `enhanced cooperation agreements' (ECA, the technical term
for sub-unions), conditioning this possibility to the satisfaction of a number of detailed
political constraints1.
1The rules for forming ECAs in the EU were introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The
Treaty of Nice (rati¯ed in 2003) removed the veto power which the former treaty left to each country,
thus making the implementation of ECAs much easier. At the present, to form an ECA at least 8
EU members must be involved, the ECA must be approved by quali¯ed majority in the Council of
2The debate over the role of ECAs is still open. Richard Baldwin et al. (2001), for
instance, argue that \After Nice...Council of Ministers' decision making will be enor-
mously di±cult...ECAs could become the main engine of future European integration".
Other observers do not share this optimistic view. Some contend that ECAs fall way
s h o r to fw h a tt h eE Uw o u l dr e a l l yn e e dt ob e c o m ea ne ± c i e n tp o l i c ym a k i n gb o d y .
Symmetrically, others see ECAs as a hidden way to overcome the unanimity require-
ment for the adoption of most policies in the EU and fear the formation of a two-speed
Europe. However, to our knowledge, no formal analysis has been o®ered so far to sup-
port either claim or to discuss the optimality of the speci¯c provisions introduced in
the Treaties for enforcing sub-unions2.
In this paper, we make a ¯rst step in this direction. For the reasons previously
pointed out, we believe that in order to cast light on this debate, an explicit dynamic
and stochastic framework is required. We develop such a framework on the basis of a
very simple model. The task of our analysis is to sharpen our intuition on the problem
and not to address any speci¯c policy issues. However, to add concreteness to the
discussion, we choose an example where ECAs are likely to become important in the
EU, the harmonization of accounting and taxing rules for corporations3.
In our model, there are two periods and three countries. Two countries have initial
accounting standards which are closer than that of the third, so that these two coun-
tries are natural candidates to form a sub-union in the ¯rst period. In each period,
each country can invest capital either at home or partly in the other countries. Har-
monization of standards is bene¯cial because it reduces the costs of investing abroad,
but the bene¯ts from this investment are uncertain in the ¯rst period.
In this setting we ask whether, on e±ciency grounds, harmonization of the standards
between the two closer countries (i.e. an ECA) should be allowed in the ¯rst period, and
under which governance rules for the federation. We begin the analysis considering the
benchmark case in which a benevolent planner can freely choose harmonization policies
and lump sum transfers for all countries involved. We derive conditions under which
ECA should be preferred to either decentralization or complete harmonization in the
¯rst period. We show that there is indeed a set of parameters where ECA dominates
Ministers, and the European Commission, which is made by representatives of all EU members, is
given a role, depending on the issue, to assess the compatibility of the proposed ECA with the other
institutions governing the Union. See Richard Baldwin et al. (2001) for further details.
2Formal analysis of the functioning of the peculiar European institutions is surprisingly scarce and
it usually focuses on voting procedures. See for instance Widgr¶ en, 2001 on Enhanced Cooperation and
Noury et al., 2003 on the European Parliament. See also Inman and Rubin¯eld, 1998, Wrede, 2002,
Perotti, 2001, Tabellini, 2002 and Stehn, 2002 for a general discussion of the allocation of economic
competencies between the EU and the member states.
3Di®erences in legal and accounting rules for corporate taxation across the European countries are
well known to represent one of the main obstacles for an e±cient allocation of capital in Europe, see
the Ruding Report (1992) and the survey by Bond et al. (2000). Years of discussions and even several
European Commission proposals for across-the-board harmonization have not been successful so far.
The di®erence in current practices across European countries is simply too large for all of them to
agree to pay the costs of the adoption of a common standard. Furthermore, the overall bene¯ts -
and their distribution across countries- of an harmonization policy are very di±cult to assess at the
present. However, for historical reasons, di®erences in accounting standards are lower for subsets of the
EU countries than they are for the Union as a whole. It is then quite possible that the adoption of a
common standard for corporate income could become one of the ¯rst example of enhanced cooperation
in the future EU.
3all other possible alternatives. Quite intuitively, ECA is better than centralization
if the variance of the standards inside the sub-union is su±ciently smaller that the
variance in the federation at large. Furthermore, we show that at the optimal enhanced
cooperation policy, the country outside the sub-union is never penalized with respect to
decentralization. This is so because at this policy, harmonization in the second period,
if it happens, still occurs at the same (e±cient) level as it does under decentralization.
Next, we consider what happens when we introduce real world political imper-
fections in the system. We consider ¯rst the case in which lump sum compensating
transfers across countries are not available, but countries can still commit to harmonize
in the second period at the e±cient standard. We show that in this case the set of
parameters such that ECA is optimal unambiguously increases with respect to central-
ization. Under centralization a single standard is imposed over heterogenous countries,
and this makes it more likely that some country will need compensatory transfers.
If transfers are costly, this decreases the social welfare generated by centralization.
Countries are more homogeneous in a sub-union, which leads to lower transfers. Thus,
the social loss caused by the fact that transfers are costly tends to be smaller under
enhanced cooperation.
Results are reversed if we assume instead that countries can use lump sum transfers
b u tc a n n o tc o m m i ti nt h e¯ r s tp e r i o dt oh a r m o n i z a t i o na tt h ee ± c i e n ts t a n d a r di n
the second period. In this case, even if the standard is chosen e±ciently in the second
period, the countries forming a sub-union have an incentive to manipulate the standard
to their advantage in the ¯rst period. This implies that if the third country joins
in the second period, it is penalized with respect to decentralization. In this case,
the enhanced cooperation solution may become sup-optimal with respect to straight
centralization or decentralization.
These results have important implications for the present debate in the EU and in
other international unions. They suggest that ECA can indeed be a valid alternative
to immediate centralization, and that this alternative improves if the federation ¯nds it
increasingly more costly to pay compensations to the countries which are more penal-
ized by immediate centralization (a situation which certainly characterizes the present
situation in Europe). But for these bene¯ts from ECA to materialize it is necessary to
design institutions which prevent the countries forming a sub-union from using their
¯rst mover advantage against the excluded countries. This may explain why the present
arrangements in the EU allow excluded countries to have some decision power on the
sub-union policy itself (through the European Commission and the European Parlia-
ment). On normative grounds, the question is whether these arrangements are enough
to protect more periferic countries from expropriation. Otherwise, ECAs may lead to
ine±cient outcomes.
Another important point is that, under the present Treaty of Nice rules, a group of
countries can form an ECA without the consent of excluded countries. We show that
this is an e®ective way to increase the probability that a centralized solution will be
accepted by all members.
This paper is related to many other pieces of literature. Dewatripont et al. (1995)
were the ¯rst to note the potential advantages of ECAs (that they term `°exible in-
tegration') on a number of issues in the European Union, and stressed the advantage
of experimentation and learning associated with ECAs for other countries as well (a
4point which is ignored in our work). Alesina et al. (2001a,b, 2003) analyze a dynamic
model, as we do, but their setting is di®erent. They focus on a time inconsistency
problem associated with union formation, and they exploit the median voter's theorem
to prove that unions will tend to be smaller and more centralized than it would be
optimal (see also Roberts (1999)), and propose a number of institutional solutions,
including enhanced cooperation mechanisms4. Levy (1997) discusses a similar issue,
but in a di®erent context. He shows that bilateral trade agreements may undermine
political support for multilateral ones, by rising the reservation utility of the median
voters in the two countries. More related to the present work is the stream of research
originated by the work of Fernandez and Rodrick (1991) on switching majorities in a
dynamic and uncertain framework (see Gerard Roland, 2000, chapter 2, for an exten-
sive coverage of this literature and several extensions to political reforms). However,
there is no application of this idea to the issue of harmonization and sub-unions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the benchmark case in which the countries are able to commit and lump-sum
transfers are available. Section 4 analyzes how the results are modi¯ed when transfers
a r ec o s t l ya n dw h e nt h ec o u n t r i e sa r eu n a b l et oc o m m i tt of u t u r ep o l i c i e s .I ta l s os h o w s
that the rules introduced by the Treaty of Nice are likely to lead to more centralization.
Section 5 concludes the paper. All the proofs are collected in the appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
There are three countries, belonging to a federation, and two periods. Each country is
characterized by a di®erent standard !!. The set of all possible standards is given by the
interval [0"1] and !! i st h eh i s t o r i c a l l yd e t e r m i n e ds t a n d a r do fc o u n t r y#.W ea s s u m e





and !3 = 1, so that the standards of countries 1 and 2 are `closer'
than that of country 3. Standards can be changed, but this is costly, as new laws are
to be drafted and approved, professionals (accountants, lawyers, tax o±cials etc.) need
to be trained anew, the inevitable mistakes generated in the transition period have to
be ¯xed and so on. The cost of adopting a new standard is quadratic in the distance
of the new standard from the historical one, i.e. if country # adopts the new standard
$ at time 0 it pays the cost ($ ¡ !!)
2.
Harmonization of standards is potentially bene¯cial because it may facilitate capital
movements. We assume that each country has one unity %! = 1 of capital available for
investment at the beginning of each period. Each country can invest its capital in any
of the three countries, using a technology displaying decreasing returns to scale. Let
x =($1"$ 2"$ 3) be the triplet of standards chosen in the three countries. If country #
invests an amount %!" in country & at time 0 then the return is:
’!" (%!""("x)=(%#
!" ¡ )*[$!"%0&’!6=’"].
where ( is a random variable whose value is unknown at time 0, + 2 (0"1) and ) is a
¯xed cost which is paid when capital is invested in a country with a di®erent standard (*
is the indicator function, taking value 1 when %!" , 0a n d$! 6= $" and zero otherwise).
4See also Alesina and Grilli (1993) and Alesina et al.(2001) for empirical evidence.
5We assume that ) is very large, so that no country wishes to invest in another country
having a di®erent standard5.T h e v a r i a b l e ( is intended to capture the uncertainty
about the returns from harmonization. When ( is low, investing capital abroad only
brings small bene¯ts, which in turn implies that the costs necessary for harmonization
may not be worth paying. When ( is high, harmonization may become convenient if
+ is small enough. For simplicity, we assume that ( can only take two values6, ( =0
with probability 1 ¡ - and ( = 1 with probability -. Notice also that we assume that
the productivity of the capital invested by country # in country & is independent of the
capital invested by other countries. The assumption is not essential, and the analysis
could be generalized to account for externalities.
If $1 = $2 = $3 , standards pose no barrier to the movement of capital. In this case,
each country would invest 1
3 of the capital available in each country. If standards are
di®erent, then the optimal investment policy for a given country depends on the value
of the parameters. Either a country is included in the set in which a positive investment
is made, or it is not. Given our assumed technology, capital is equally divided among
the countries in which a positive investment is made, while no investment is made in
the other countries.
The countries have to trade o® the cost of changing the historically given standards
with the new investment opportunities that harmonization of standards brings about.
At period 0 the value of the new investment opportunities is uncertain, as it depends
on the realization of the parameter (. At time 1, the uncertainty is resolved and the
value of the new investment opportunities is known for sure. More precisely, we assume
the following time-line for our model:
1. At time 0 the three countries adopt a triplet of policies x =( $1"$ 2"$ 3). There
are three possibilities. The three countries may adopt a common standard, two
countries may decide a common standard while the other decides to have a di®er-
ent standard, or each country may have a di®erent standard. Once the decision
on the vector x h a sb e e nt a k e n ,e a c hc o u n t r yd e c i d e sh o wt oi n v e s ti t sc a p i t a l










where expectation is taken over the value of (.
2. At the end of period 0 the value of ( is observed. At this point, a new vector
x0 is chosen, according to the rules of the federation. The countries have a new
endowment of one unit of capital, and the capital is invested. The utility of











5The assumptions that the cost is ¯xed and independent of j!! ¡ !"j, the distance between the two
standards, is for simplicity only. The same results can be obtained for more general cost functions.
6This formulation implies that the returns from investing at home are also uncertain and may turn
out to be zero. This assumption is made only for simplicity; nothing substantial would change if we
assumed that only the returns from investing abroad are uncertain.
6where / is a function which takes into account the modi¯cation of the bliss point
as consequence of the choice of the standard in the previous period.
We allow for changes in the bliss point over time when new standards are adopted.7.
The two extreme cases are /(!!"$ !)=!! (preferences do not change with the adoption
of the new standard) and /(!!"$ !)=$! (the country fully adapts at time 1 to the new
standard adopted at time 0). For simplicity we adopt the linear speci¯cation:
/(!!"$ !)=0$! +( 1¡ 0)!!
with 0 2 [0"1].
Notice that the decision at period 1 is taken after having observed the value of
(. A low realization of ( implies that the gains from cooperation are not as high as
expected, and in that case the best thing to do for each country is simply to stick to
the new ideal point /($!"! !). A high realization of ( will tilt the balance in favor of
more integration. Importantly, this may imply that a country which decided not to
integrate at time 0 might now be willing to harmonize its standard. The main issue
becomes what should be done in this case, that is how the new policy x0 should be
selected.
3 E±cient Solution
We begin by deriving the e±cient decision, that is the decisions about the standards
which would maximize the sum of the three countries' utilities. Note that this could
also be seen as the case in which all decisions are taken under unanimity rule by a
benevolent planner who can enforce costless transfers across countries.
3.1 The Second Period Problem
We start analyzing the optimal decision once the value of ( is known. If the realization
is ( = 0 then it is always optimal to decentralize the decision. In this case, each country
will select as a new standard $0
! = /($!"! !).
If the realization is ( = 1, then further harmonization may be optimal. When a










$0 ¡ /($!"! !)
¢2 +3 1¡#
´
The e±cient solution is then to minimize the total cost
P3
!=1 ($0 ¡ /($!"! !))
2 with






7The bliss point can move only partially towards the new standard because of adjustment costs. As
an example of these adjustment costs, one may think to the accountants or the tax o±cials who are
yet not trained or fully accostumed to the new rules and who would therefore welcome a partial return
to the old rules.
7yielding a total payo® of:









When countries 1 and 2 only adopt a common policy in period 1 (the `enhanced coop-





yielding a total payo® for the federation of:









(the third country pays no adjustment cost and gets a return of 1 investing the capital
at home). Finally, when standards are di®erent each country only invests domestically
and the total payo® is:
1* =3
Which of the three policies is optimal depends on the value of + and on the two triplets
($1"$ 2"$ 3)a n d( !1"! 2"! 3). There is however a natural monotonicity. Lower values of
+ make it more convenient to split capital across countries, and therefore tend to favor
harmonization. This monotonicity property is made precise in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the second period problem when ( =1 . For every given value
of the triplets ($1"$ 2"$ 3) and (!1"! 2"! 3), there are values +1 and +2,w i t h0 3+ 1 ·
+2 3 1 such that full harmonization is optimal for + 2 [0"+ 1], enhanced cooperation
between countries 1 and 2 is optimal for + 2 (+1"+ 2) and decentralization is optimal
for + 2 [+2"1].
The proposition is quite intuitive. When + is small, it pays a lot to split capital across
countries. Thus, full harmonization is optimal. When + is close to 1 the technology is
close to constant returns to scale, and the advantage of splitting capital is small. In this
case it is better to avoid paying the adjustment costs, and decentralization is optimal.
In intermediate cases, enhanced cooperation may be preferred. Notice that the case
+1 = +2 cannot be excluded; in this case enhanced cooperation is never optimal in
period 1.
3.2 The Ex-Ante Problem
We now turn to the ex ante problem. In order to focus on the dynamic trade-o®s of
partial integration, we assume that + is su±ciently small, so that full harmonization
is always optimal in the second period when ( = 1. The problem that the planner
faces is therefore how to position the standards of the di®erent countries in period 0,
8We only consider the case where countries 1 and 2 form a sub-union, as this clearly dominates the
alternative sub-unions which could be formed.
8taking into account the possibility that with probability - full harmonization will occur
in period 1.
Remark. Proposition 1 establishes that full harmonization is optimal for + · +1,
w h e r et h ev a l u eo f+1 , 0 depends on the triplets x =( $1"$ 2"$ 3)a n dµ =( !1"! 2"! 3).
This implies that we are restricting ourselves to consider only the case in which + is
su±ciently small. In our context, this is the only interesting case. If the second-period
optimal policy involves decentralization when ( = 1, no harmonization ever occurs and
the optimal choice for the three countries is simply to stick to their original standards in
period 0. If enhanced cooperation between countries 1 and 2 is optimal in the second
period, then country 3 never moves from the original standard, and the planner's
problem simply reduces to decide whether to adopt a common standard immediately
for countries 1 and 2 or wait until time 1. The solution trivially depends on -;i f- is large
then the two countries immediately harmonize their standard, while if - is small they
wait until period 1 and harmonize the standards if ( = 1. In both cases, harmonization
always occurs at the cost-minimizing standard (!1 + !2)42. Notice however that in the
second case, as long as both -,0a n d0,0, countries 1 and 2 will nevertheless
move their standards a little bit closer in period 0, in anticipation of the possible
harmonization in period 1. This is so because with a convex cost function, it is always
optimal to spread the cost of adopting a common standard over the two periods, and
0,0 allows to make some steps forwards in the period 0. The main point however
is that in this case the third country does not move from its original standard in any
period, and therefore there is no potential trade-o® between the utility of the sub-union
a n dt h a to ft h et h i r dc o u n t r y .
By the analysis of the previous section, we know that in the second period the




43w h e n( =1 . T h e r ea r e
then three cases to consider ex ante.


















If a common standard $1 is only imposed for countries 1 and 2, while country 3 selects
$3 then the expected welfare is:
1)(
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43 .A tl a s t ,w h e ni np e r i o d1t h ec o u n t r i e s
adopt a triplet ($1"$ 2"$ 3) such that the three numbers are di®erent, we have:
1*















9We now solve for the optimal policy in the di®erent cases. As a matter of notation, let:
1$
¤ (-"0)=m a x
x2X# 1$
0 (x)
where % 2f 5"6)")g refers to the policy adopted in the ¯rst period and X$ is the set of
feasible choices given policy % (for example, if % = ) then only triplets x =($"$"$)a r e






























=( $! ¡ !!)
for # =1 "2"3. Summing up the three FOCs we have
P3
"=1 $" =3 !,s ot h a ti nt h e
second period the optimal point is !. Substituting, we get:
$*







The optimal choice under decentralization is a weighted average of the current standard
!! and the standard to be adopted in case of harmonization. Despite the fact that in
the current period no harmonization occurs, for 0,0, it is convenient to move the
standard towards ! in anticipation of the possible harmonization in the future period
since, with a convex cost function, this decreases the expected cost of harmonization.
The extent of the movement today depends on how likely is harmonization tomorrow
(i.e. how large is -) and how e®ective is the movement today in changing the ideal
point (i.e. how large is 0). Formally, the weight -04
¡
1+-02¢
increases in - and 0,
reaching a maximum of 1
2 when harmonization occurs with probability 1 and there is
immediate adaptation to the new standard. In that case the cost of harmonization is
sustained with probability 1, and the countries move half-way to the optimal standard
to be set in the following period.
It is worth noting at this point that country # is willing to choose voluntarily the
point$*
! provided it is assured that the standard ! will be chosen in case of centralization
in the second period. In other words, in order to implement the decentralized allocation
a benevolent planner does not have to intervene directly in the choice of standard of each
country. Rather, the outcome can be implemented simply by making a commitment to
having centralization at ! whenever ( = 1, and then letting the countries choose their
standards independently.










Consider now the case of enhanced cooperation. The ¯rst order conditions with respect
to $1 and $3 yield:
(!1 + !2) ¡
0-(1 ¡ 0)
3














0 (1 ¡ 0)-
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Notice that (2$1 + $3)43=!, so that if countries harmonize in the second period, they
do so again at !.
The solution under enhanced cooperation is similar to the one we obtained under
decentralization and can be explained along the same lines. Under enhanced coopera-
tion the countries behave as in the decentralized solution, but with countries 1 and 2
`combined' together in a single country with an ideal point equal to their mid point,










and from (1), $)(
1 is the standard which would be chosen under decentralization by a
country with original standard (!1 + !2)42.
The intuition for this result is simple. Under enhanced cooperation, the planner
must solve two problems at once. First, it must choose a common standard for the
two countries joining the sub-union. Second, it must optimally adjust this standard in
anticipation of the (possible) harmonization of the second period. Since harmonization
in the second period, if it does so, occurs at ! , the optimal solution is then to adopt
the decentralized solution for the sub-union as a whole, and then split in two the extra
costs for harmonization between the two countries, choosing the mid point between
their (optimal) decentralized solutions.
To make this point clearer, we can exploit further the fact that $)(
1 is equal to the
decentralized solution for a country with standard (!1 + !2)42 to write total utility



















The total expected cost under enhanced cooperation is equal to the cost under de-
centralization, plus an extra term which measures the additional costs imposed on
countries 1 and 2 from partial harmonization. Since 8 (-"0) is strictly positive for any
























so that 8 is a decreasing and convex function of -.
For future reference, it is also useful to compute the utility that each country enjoys
under enhanced cooperation. For country 3, as $)(
3 = $*
3,w e l f a r ei se x a c t l yt h es a m e
under enhanced cooperation and under decentralization. The utility of country #,w i t h
# =1 "2, is obtained substituting $)(

















Note, as argued above, that the cost that each country joining the sub-union pays
is equal to the one paid under decentralization plus half the extra cost needed to
harmonize the standards of the two countries at period 0. This result will be useful
when we discuss the case of costly transfers.
Finally, it is immediate to see that in the case in which harmonization occurs im-
mediately then the optimal standard is $( = !. The expected welfare under immediate
harmonization can then be written as:
1(








We are now in a position to compare the welfare of the federation under the three

































Expected bene¯ts are always higher under centralization than under decentralization,
but so are the costs. Enhanced cooperation is an intermediate case, which allows
to reap some of the advantages of harmonization at lower costs than centralization.
In particular, other things being equal, it is clear that the advantage of enhanced
cooperation versus centralization increases when the distance !3 ¡! increases. Signing
the e®ect of 0 on the di®erence between the utility functions under the di®erent regimes
is more di±cult, since 8 (-"0)i sn o tm o n o t o n ei n0.H o w e v e r , w e c a n p r o v e t h e
following result.
Proposition 2 There exist two values -¤ and -¤¤,w i t h0 3- ¤ · -¤¤ 3 1 such that
when - 2 [0"- ¤] decentralization at period 0 is optimal, when - 2 [-¤"- ¤¤] enhanced
cooperation is optimal, and when - 2 [-¤¤"1] then centralization is optimal.
12Intuitively centralization always dominates decentralization when - is close to 1, so
that it is very likely that harmonization will be successful. On the other hand, decen-
tralization always dominates centralization when - is close to 0, as it is very likely that
harmonization would not bring trade bene¯ts. However, the proposition also implies
that for intermediate values of -, enhanced cooperation may be the e±cient solution
of a social welfare maximization problem. Notice that the optimal policy in this case
entails some change in the standard of the excluded country in the ¯rst period as well.
However, as shown above, under enhanced cooperation the excluded country adopts
the decentralized solution. This implies that, if countries are able to commit to har-
monization at ! in the second period, then country 3 would voluntarily choose $)(
3 in
the ¯rst period. We will come back to this in the next section.
Proposition 2 only establishes that -¤ · -¤¤.I f-¤ = -¤¤ then enhanced cooperation
is never optimal, and the optimal policy switches from decentralization to centralization
as - increases. Whether or not the set (-¤"- ¤¤) is empty depends on the parameters
of the problem, and in particular on the values of 0 and !22 Intuitively, the main
factor which may a®ect the optimality of the enhanced cooperation solution is the
distance between !2 and !12When the bliss points of the two countries are very close,
the cost of setting an identical standard for countries 1 and 2 in the ¯rst period is small
and it might therefore be worth paying it to have the additional bene¯ts of partial
harmonization. On the other hand, if !2 = +1++3
2 (country 2 is equally distant from the
other two countries) then the costs of partial harmonization are very high and enhanced
cooperation is less likely to be optimal. Building on this intuition, we now prove:
Proposition 3 If !2 = !1 then -¤ =0and -¤¤ , 0.W h e n!2 increases, -¤ increases
and -¤¤ decreases.
Since all the functions are continuous, the proposition implies that when !2 is suf-
¯ciently close to !1 then the interval (-¤"- ¤¤) is certainly non-empty. The interval
shrinks as !2 increases. When !2 increases the value of 72
+ decreases, reaching a mini-
mum at the point !2 = +1++3




+, they increase. This is intuitive, as a lower 72
+ i m p l i e st h a ti ti sl e s sc o s t l yt o
centralize in the second period. This e®ect is also present in the case of enhanced
cooperation, but there is now a countervailing e®ect. When !2 increases, the distance
between !2 and !1 increases and this increases the cost of harmonizing the standard for
countries 1 and 2 in the ¯rst period. It can be shown that when !2 is close to !1 the
e®ect relative to 72
+ prevails, so that 1)(
¤ increases. However, as !2 gets closer to +1++3
2
the second e®ect prevails, so that 1)(
¤ actually decreases. At any rate, the presence
of the second e®ect implies that in general 1)(
¤ grows more slowly than 1*
¤ and 1(
¤,
therefore reducing the set of values of the parameters in which enhanced cooperation
is optimal9.
9This does not imply that when "2 =
$1+$3
2 enhanced cooperation is never optimal. For instance,
for # = $ =0a n d"2 =1 %2, enhanced cooperation is optimal for 3%32 &’&2%32. The reason is
that under enhanced cooperation costs are always lower than under centralization. Hence, even if the
bene¯ts from harmonization are extremely high, it might be worth moving from decentralization to
enhanced cooperation, rather than to centralization directly, as ’ increases.
134 Applications
So far we have derived conditions under which enhanced cooperation may dominate
the alternatives, in the benchmark case in which nondistorting transfers can be used
and e±cient solutions are enforced. As we have shown above, under any of the three
mechanisms considered, harmonization in the second period always occurs at the e±-
cient level ! when ( = 1. Thus, if nondistortionary transfers are available, the e±cient
solution can always be implemented when the countries decide by unanimity and are
able to write at period 0 an agreement (contract) contingent on the realization of (.
In this section we pose the following question: Does the case for enhanced coop-
eration become more robust under more realistic constraints on the working of the
federation? We discuss how the results change when transfers are costly and when the
countries are unable to commit to future choices, and we conclude with an analysis of
the rules for ECAs as included in the recent Treaty of Nice.
4.1 Costly Transfers
Suppose that compensating transfers across countries cannot be made or can be made
only at a cost, for example because money has to be collected through distortionary
taxation10. However, in the ¯rst period countries can still write a binding contract,
committing them to harmonize at the e±cient level ! in the second period whenever
( = 1. The important implication is that the formation of a sub-union in the ¯rst period
does not a®ect the choice of the standard in the second period, and therefore cannot
reduce the welfare of the excluded country. More speci¯cally, assume the following
decision process:
1. At time 0, all countries agree to harmonize standards at ! in period 1 if ( =1 .
2. At time 0, a benevolent planner also makes a proposal about the current period,
possibly together with a set of transfers. If the planner proposes enhanced co-
operation or centralization and the proposal is unanimously accepted then the
prescribed policies and the proposed transfers are enacted. Otherwise, no trans-
fer takes place and the countries are free to select the standard they desire in the
current period.
Under the decision procedure spelled out above, each country can at least obtain a
utility equal to the utility obtained under the decentralization policy. This is so because,
as we have shown above, if no harmonization occurs at period 0, but it is known that
in the second period harmonization will occur at !, the best choice for each country
coincides with the decentralized option.
This implies that under enhanced cooperation or centralization each country has













10In the context of the European Union intergovernmental compensating transfers are typically not
used, suggesting a very high cost for transferring funds. When a country is hurt by some policy decision,
it is often compensated by distorting other pieces of legislation or through sectorial or regional grants
which, in principle, should be used for di®erent objectives. See Tabellini (2002) on this point.
14When deciding which policy to implement, the planner has now to take into account
these individual rationality constraints. If any of the constraints is violated at the
optimal solution described in the previous section, then the planner will have to take
measures to accommodate the country not receiving enough utility. This can be done
either through costly transfers or by distorting the policies proposed in the ¯rst period
away from the e±cient level. In any case, the social value of the policy is reduced when
transfers are costly.
We now notice that whenever the values of the parameters are such that the sum of
the utilities under enhanced cooperation is greater than the sum of the utilities under
decentralization (that is, 1)(
¤ ¸ 1*
¤) then each country obtains a utility equal at least
to 1*
¤!.








The implication of the proposition is that a policy of enhanced cooperation can always
be implemented without transfers, provided that the countries are able to commit to
harmonization at ! in the second period. Therefore, the fact that transfers are costly
and individual rationality constraints have to be satis¯ed has no impact whatsoever on
the social welfare which can be attained under enhanced cooperation. A decentraliza-
tion policy also does not require transfers.
This leads to the conclusion that the only policy which is penalized under costly
transfers is centralization. In turn, this implies that when transfers are costly the set of
parameters such that enhanced cooperation is superior to centralization unambiguously
(weakly) expands.
In terms of implementation, the proposition also means that the enhanced cooper-
ation policy could be entirely decentralized. The two countries forming the sub-union
could be left to decide as they wish the policy to be implemented in the ¯rst period
and the excluded country would be left free to adjust. Provided that the countries are
able to commit to harmonization at ! in the second period, the two countries would au-
tonomously choose the optimal solution for the sub-union and the third country would
choose the optimal decentralized solution. Furthermore, ex post it would still be true
that the optimal centralization policy in the second period is !.
The fact that the enhanced cooperation policy does not require transfers to be
implemented does not hold generally. For example, if we considered a federation with
a larger number of countries and sub-unions composed by more than two countries
it may be that (costly) transfers across the countries joining the sub-union and/or
distortions in the ¯rst period policy would also be needed to support the enhanced
cooperation solution. However, it would still be true that as long as countries can
commit to harmonize at the e±cient level in the second period, the excluded countries
would not need any compensating transfers. Furthermore, as long as the variance of the
standards inside the sub-union is smaller than that of the federation at large, it would
always be true that the extra costs needed to support enhanced cooperation would be
strictly lower that those needed to support centralization. Hence, the insight that the
presence of costly transfers increases the e±ciency of the enhanced cooperation with
respect to centralization holds more generally.
154.2 No Commitment
Assume now that costless transfers can be enforced but that the three countries can no
longer commit at time 0 on the standard at which harmonization should occur in the
n e x tp e r i o d .I nm a n yr e l e v a n tc a s e s ,t h e r em a ys i m p l yb en ow a yt oe n f o r c et h i sk i n d
of commitment in a federation, as the countries may ¯nd it optimal ex post to agree
to a di®erent policy. This generates a standard temporal inconsistency problem, since
the countries may now try to use their choice of the standard in the current period in
order to in°uence the decision in the subsequent period11.
We study this problem by assuming the following set up. Suppose that the stan-
dards of the three countries have not been harmonized at period zero. Then, at period










where $! is the standard adopted by country # at time 0. This is the choice which
maximizes the sum of the utilities at time 1, and it will be accepted unanimously
since, when ( = 1, each country prefers centralization. Hence, under decentralization,
the countries will know for sure that with probability -, centralization will occur at P3
!=1 /($!"! !)43i np e r i o d1 .
Suppose now that decentralization prevails at period zero, so that the three coun-
tries are free to choose their own standard. If each country is left free to move its
standard, it must then realize that by moving its own standard at time 0 it is also
going to a®ect the harmonized standard which will be enforced with probability - at
time 1, since
P3
!=1 /($!"! !)43d e p e n d so n$! (whenever 0,0). With no commitment,
what we are after is then a Nash equilibrium in the choices of the standards in the ¯rst
period. The next proposition describes this equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If decentralization prevails in the ¯rst period then, in the unique Nash
equilibrium, the choice of country # is:
$,-









Notice that when the standards $,-
! a r ec h o s e ni np e r i o d0 ,h a r m o n i z a t i o no ft h e
standards in the period 1, when it happens, occurs again at !. Comparing the ¯rst
period choices in the Nash equilibrium with what should occur under a commitment




¯ ¯ ¯ , 0. This implies
that, while the choice at the second period is unchanged, in a Nash equilibrium each
country moves less in the ¯rst period than under commitment12. The intuition is
11In general, the countries belonging to a federation can only commit to follow determinate proce-
dures, rather than commit to implement a given policy. In the case of the EU, for example, choices
regarding the admission of new members or further integration on particular issues are taken by the
Council following pre-determined decision rules, and are not decided ex ante on the bases of the real-
ization of particular contingencies.
12For instance, when ’ = $ = 1 the optimal choice would be to cover half of the distance from " and
"! in the ¯rst period. In a Nash equilibrium the countries only cover 2/5 of it.
16straightforward. In choosing its standard in period 0 under decentralization and no
commitment each country has to trade-o® two e®ects. On the one hand, by moving
away from its historical standard it reduces the expected costs of harmonization to be
paid in the period 1. On the other hand, by keeping its choice in period 0 closer to
its historical standard, it forces the planner in period 1 to choose an harmonization
policy which is closer to its preferred point. At the equilibrium point, these e®orts to
manipulate the choice of the agenda setter at time 1 are frustrated, as the countries
end up by exactly o®setting each other and harmonization still occurs at !. However,
as a result of these contrasting incentives, each country moves less than it would be
optimal to do to minimize its total expected costs. The conclusion is that the lack of
commitment decreases the social value of a decentralization policy.
On the contrary, it is immediate to see that, as long as the countries can enforce
costless transfers, centralization is not a®ected by the lack of commitment. If the
countries accept to harmonize the standards at ! at period zero, then the same standard
will be optimal subsequently (when ( =1 ) .
Consider now the case of enhanced cooperation. Since lump sum transfers are
available, the two countries in the sub-union will choose the standard which minimizes
the sum of their costs. From the previous analysis, we know that this standard will






However, in setting up this standard, the two countries must also realize that their
choice in the ¯rst period is going to a®ect the choice of the planner in the second
period. In this case, we have the following equilibrium.
Proposition 6 There is a unique Nash equilibrium in the positioning game between
the sub-union of countries 1 and 2 on one side and country 3 on the other side. The






























so that in the second period the standard chosen in the case of harmonization turns
out to be strictly lower than the e±cient quantity !. The reason lies in the asymmetry
existing between the sub-union and the third country in terms of in°uence on the ¯nal
standard. When the sub-union moves the current standard by ¢$, the ¯nal standard
moves by 2
30¢$,w h i l eam o v e m e n to f¢ $ by the third country moves the ¯nal standard
only by 1









17so that the countries in the sub-union move their standards less, and the third country
more, than in the decentralized Nash equilibrium.
Since centralization is una®ected by lack of commitment, the conclusion is then that
the case for enhanced cooperation becomes weaker when commitment is impossible.
More precisely, the set of parameters such that immediate centralization is better than
enhanced cooperation unambiguously expands.
4.3 Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice
We can use our framework to evaluate the impact of the rules for the formation of
ECAs in the European Union, as recently introduced in the Treaty of Nice. A stylized
representation of these rules in our context could go as follows:
1. A (quali¯ed) majority of Member States can agree to form an ECA on selected
issues. The approval of countries not belonging to the ECA is not necessary, but
all countries have the right to enter into the agreement if they so desire.
2. Common policies can be changed only by unanimous agreement13 of the countries
b e l o n g i n gt ot h eE C A .
The Treaty does not contemplate any mechanism for monetary compensation in rela-
tion to the formation of ECAs. Furthermore, no clear mechanism for committing to
future changes of the current policies seems to be in place14. Therefore, the actual
mechanism set up in the Treaty can be characterized as one in which neither mone-
tary compensation nor commitment take place, and furthermore ECAs do not need
unanimity to be implemented.
Our previous analysis has shown that the lack of commitment tends to favor central-
ization, while the lack of monetary transfers penalizes the centralized solution. Those
conclusions were obtained under the assumption that an individual rationality con-
straint had to be satis¯ed for each country. The actual rules in the European Union
allow for the formation of ECAs even if the excluded countries do not agree. The
main di®erence with the previous analysis is therefore that the individual rationality
constraint for those countries need not be satis¯ed.
Proposition 6 shows that, when there is no commitment, the formation of an en-
hanced cooperation damages the interests of the excluded country. The conclusion was
obtained under the assumption that in the second period a socially optimal standard
(that is,
P
/($!&!!)43) would be chosen in the second period. The rules contained in
the Treaty of Nice reinforce this e®ect, since the standard in the second period can
only be changed by unanimity. This essentially implies that, once a standard is set by
13The decision rules for a sub-union are the same that prevail for the EU at large on the same subject.
As we are here discussing of corporate taxation and accounting rules, the decision rule is unanimity.
14All EU countries may participate at the discussion about the policy to be selected in a ECA, but
only the countries joining the ECA have the right to vote on this policy, according to the EU rules
prevailing for the subject where the ECA is formed. Notice that where the so called `co-determination'
procedure is in place, the European Parliament is also involved in voting on the sub-union policy. The
European Parliament decides by simple majority, and all countries, including those not belonging to
the sub-union, partecipate to the ballot. For further details, see again Baldwin et al. (2002) and Erik
Berglof et al. (2003).
18an ECA in the ¯rst period, it cannot be changed in the second period. Basically, a
country remaining out of the ECA in the ¯rst period faces a `take it or leave it' deal
in the second period: Integration can only be achieved at the terms established by the
countries who formed the ECA in the ¯rst period.
There is no reason to expect that the outcome under such rules should be e±cient.
The interesting question however is whether they tend to induce more or less central-
ization. We now argue that the rules for ECAs introduced in the Treaty of Nice make
centralization a more likely outcome. The basic reason is that the third country may
prefer to join immediately the ECA (thus yielding immediate centralization), and so
have a say in the choice of the standard, rather than wait until the second period and
be forced to accept the standard chosen by the other countries.
To make this argument more precise, observe that without commitment Proposition
6 implies that country 3 is worse o® with respect to decentralization, and therefore
it would approve an ECA only if compensated with a monetary transfer or with a
distortion in the standard chosen by the two countries forming the sub-union. When
this is impossible, enhanced cooperation is rejected. In such a situation the only two
possible outcomes are centralization and decentralization, and centralization prevails if
and only if it is superior to decentralization for the three countries.
Suppose now that the approval of country 3 is no longer necessary, and that for
certain values of the parameters countries 1 and 2 ¯nd it pro¯table to form an enhanced
cooperation in the ¯rst period. Then the relevant comparison for country 3 is between
the utility obtained under centralization and the utility obtained when the remaining
two countries form an ECA. Since this is strictly lower that the utility obtained under
decentralization, country 3 will be prepared to accept centralization more often than
in the previous case. We therefore have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 If the countries cannot commit to future policies and no monetary
transfers are available then centralization occurs more often under the rules established
in the Treaty of Nice than under a rule which requires unanimity in the ¯rst period to
form an ECA.
Notice that the proposition states that centralization, rather than enhanced coopera-
tion, is more likely. In other words, the introduction of the rules to form ECA's in the
EU may be in reality just a device to bypass the objections to further centralization
of some countries15. Is this good or bad for social welfare? This depends on whether
one believes that the rules existing before the introduction of ECA were biased against
centralization or not. Many observers would agree that, when reaching agreements
inside the European Union, establishing proper monetary transfers or installing mech-
anisms to commit to change future decisions is di±cult. This might tend to bias the
15In this sense, the European Commission, which was the great sponsor of the introduction of ECA
in the Treaty of Nice and in particular of the removal of the veto power on ECA assigned to all countries
in the previous Treaty of Amsterdam, may have `outsmarted' the countries. Baldwin et al. (2002), in
fact, argue that the more restrictive decison rules introduced in the Treaty of Nice for the European
Council were the result of a deliberate attempt made by some countries to delay further centralization
in the EU. But our analysis suggests that these countries may have underestimated the centralization
impact of the new rules for ECA's formation.
19decisions excessively towards the status quo, which in the many cases means decen-
tralization. The introduction of rules allowing for ECAs even without the consent of
excluded countries may be a partial remedy.
5 Conclusions
We began this work by asking when it would be optimal to let some member countries
of a federation to form a sub-union, and under which decision rules for the federation.
This paper suggests the following answers. The basic trade-o® in letting sub-unions
to be formed is between the increased welfare for the countries joining immediately
the sub-union and the expected losses for the other countries in future periods, as a
consequence of a possible change in the status quo. Hence, the introduction of enhanced
cooperation mechanisms is certainly Pareto improving as long as the excluded countries
can be guaranteed against, or compensated for, this change in the status quo. We
showed that there may be a role for enhanced cooperation even in the benchmark case
of costless transfers and unanimity rules, as there may be cases where the lower costs for
supporting harmonization in a sub-union (due to the lower variance of the standards
in the sub-union than in the federation) may dominate the extra expected bene¯ts
from immediate centralization. We also showed that this e±ciency role for enhanced
cooperation tends to increase when compensating transfers become impossible or more
costly to enforce.
The bene¯cial e®ects of enhanced cooperation however hinge on the fact that the
countries joining the sub-union can commit not to change the status quo in the future or
to compensate the excluded countries for this change. If they cannot, then enhanced
cooperation may be harmful for the excluded countries and for the welfare of the
federation at large. This results from the greater power that the countries in the
sub-union have in in°uencing the future standards.
Our results o®er some important insights on the functioning of federations such as
the European Union. First, they may help to explain why the introduction of enhanced
cooperation is sometimes opposed by excluded countries. Second, in terms of the gov-
ernance rules for the federation, our results strongly suggest that, lacking commitment
power, countries which decided to opt out of the sub-union, should however be involved
i nt h ed e c i s i o np r o c e s so ft h es u b - u n i o n .F i n a l l y ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tw h e nE C A sc a n
be formed without the consent of excluded countries centralization becomes more likely.
The Treaty of Nice has set up formal rules for the formation of ECAs which do not
r e q u i r et h ec o n s e n to fe x c l u d e dc o u n t r i e s . W eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h i sm a yl e a dt oa n
increase in the level of centralization.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. First, we assumed that after
the ¯rst period uncertainty is resolved, and countries automatically learn whether it is
optimal to centralize or not. In reality, forming an ECA might be the only way to ¯nd
out if centralization on a given function is bene¯cial. Sub-unions might then be thought
of as o®ering a public good to all members of the Union and issues of free-riding and
protection of the investment, through admission policies to the sub-union, would arise
naturally. Also, there are natural complementarities between di®erent policies which
we have completely overlooked here. For example, foreign policy harmonization would
20naturally bring about centralization of defence policy. This then suggest that issues
of the optimal timing of enhanced cooperation agreements, discussing which functions
should be centralized ¯rst (along the line of Roland (2000)'s approach to reforms), may
provide interesting insights in the functioning of international unions. We believe that
an analysis of these issues would provide interesting avenues for further research.
21Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Let 1( (+)a n d1)( (+)b et h ev a l u e so f1( and 1)( as a
function of +. We want to prove that the two curves cross exactly once on the interval
[0"1]. To see that the two curves cross at least once, observe that the functions are
continuous and that 1( (0) ,1 )( (0), 1( (1) 31 )( (1). To see that they can cross at
most once, observe that the di®erence (1((+) ¡ 1)((+)) is strictly decreasing for all
values of + 2 [0"1]. Let us call +¤ the point at which 1( (+¤)=1)( (+¤).
Now notice that the payo® under decentralization, 1* =3 ,i si n d e p e n d e n to f+.
Furthermore, both 1( (+)a n d1)( (+) are decreasing functions and 1* 31 ( (0), 1* ,




.T h e n
centralization is optimal in the interval [0"+ 1]. If +1 3+ ¤ then decentralization is
optimal over the interval [+1"1]. If +1 = +¤ then there is a unique value +2 ¸ +¤
such that 1)((+2) = 3. Clearly, enhanced cooperation is optimal on (+1"+ 2)a n d
decentralization is optimal on [+2"1].
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We start observing that at - =0w eh a v e1*
¤ (0) ,1 )(
¤ (0) ,
1(
¤ (0), while at - =1w eh a v e1*
¤ (1) 31 )(
¤ (1) 31 (
¤ (1). Furthermore, using the
expressions (2)-(4) and the fact that 8 is decreasing and convex in - we can conclude
that each pair of curves crosses only once. Call b - 2 (0"1) the value such that 1(
¤ (-)=
1*
¤ (-)" e - 2 (0"1) the value such that 1(
¤ (-)=1)(
¤ (-) and, ¯nally, call - 2 (0"1)
the value such that 1)(
¤ (-)=1*
¤ (-). At this point we de¯ne -¤ =m i n fb -"-g and
-¤¤ =m a xfb -" e -g and we are done.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .I f!2 = !1 then by inspection 1)(
¤ (0"0)=1*
¤ (0"0), which
implies -¤ = 0 and 1)(
¤ (-"0) ,1 *




1 ; decentralization and enhanced cooperation prescribe the same policies).





















































This will be enough to reach our conclusion. To see this, remember that for a given !2




22If we now keep - ¯xed and we increase !2 by a small amount ¢!2 we have:
1*
¤ (-"!2 +¢ !2) ,1 )(
¤ (-"!2 +¢ !2).
Therefore, the value - = -¤ (!2 +¢ !2)a tw h i c h
1*
¤ (-"!2 +¢ !2)=1)(
¤ (-"!2 +¢ !2)
must satisfy -,-. An analogous reasoning holds for the value -¤¤.





























¡ 2(1¡ -0 (1 ¡ 0))($1 ¡ !2)
which is strictly positive since $1 3! 2 and !,! 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . It is immediate to see that the utility of country 3 is the
same under decentralization and under enhanced cooperation. Therefore, the condition
1)(
¤ ¸ 1*






















¤2 and the conclusion follows.
























The ¯rst order condition (which is also su±cient) for country # is:


















The system of three equations has the unique solution:
$,-




















¡ (1 ¡ 0)!
¶2
where !12 =( !1 + !2)42. The ¯rst order condition is:
($12 ¡ !12)+-
µ















while the condition for $3 is
($3 ¡ !3)+-
µ















Solving for the two equations we obtain:




















Proof of Proposition 7. When no commitment and no monetary transfers are avail-
able, country 3 always rejects an ECA. Therefore, if individual rationality has to be
satis¯ed, the only possible outcomes are centralization and decentralization. For a
given set of parameters, let 1(
¤! and 1*
¤! be the utilities obtained by country # under




Suppose next that countries 1 and 2 are given the possibility of forming an ECA
without the approval of country 3, and furthermore that country 3 can always join
a n dE C Aa n do b t a i nt h ec e n t r a l i z e ds o l u t i o n .I fw ec a l l10
¤! the reservation utility of
country # under the new rule, then it must be the case that 10
¤! ¸ 1*
¤! if # =1 "2, while
10
¤3 · 1*
¤3. This follows from the fact that country # 2f 1"2g can always block an
ECA if the utility is less than 1*
¤!, so the utility achieved when centralization is not
implemented must necessarily be at least 1*
¤!. On the other hand, country 3 is made
worse o® with respect to decentralization whenever countries 1 and 2 form and ECA.
Also observe that an ECA cannot be formed if country 3 prefers centralization,
since in this case country 3 could join the ECA and obtain the centralized outcome.
Therefore, the set of parameter values for which centralization occurs weakly expands.




2 then centralization does not occur either before







3 then centralization occurs before and after the introduction of ECA, so
that no change occurs. .
b) If 1(
3 31 *





We conclude that in all cases either centralization is maintained or it is introduced
w h e r ei tw a sn o tp r e s e n tb e f o r e .
24References
[1] Alesina A. and V. Grilli, 1993, \On the Feasibility of a One-speed or Multispeed
European Monetary Union", Economic and Politics, 2 (Vol.5): 145-165.
[2] Alesina A., I. Angeloni and F. Etro, 2001a, The Political Economy of International
Unions, NBER w.p. n0. 8645.
[3] Alesina A., I. Angeloni and F. Etro, 2001b, Institutional Rules for Federations,
NBER w.p. n0. 8646.
[4] Alesina A., I. Angeloni and F. Etro, 2003, The Political Economy of Fiscal Unions,
mimeo, Harvard University.
[5] Alesina A., I. Angeloni and L. Schuknecht, 2001, What Does the European Union
Do?, NBER w.p. n0. 8647.
[6] E. Berglof, B. Eichengreen, G. Roland, G. Tabellini and C. Wyplosz, 2003, Built
to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe,C E P R ,M o n i t o r i n gE u r o p e a nU n i o n
12, London.
[7] Richard Baldwin, Erik Berglof, Francesco Giavazzi and Mika Widgren, 2001, Nice
Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Rati¯ed?,C E P R ,M o n i t o r i n gE u r o p e a nU n i o n
11, London.
[8] Bond S., Chennel L., Devereux M.P., Gammie M., and Troup E., 2000, Corpo-
rate Tax Harmonization in Europe: A Guide to the Debate, London, Institute of
Economic Studies.
[9] Dewatripont, M., Giavazzi, F., Harden, I., Persson, T. , Roland, G., Sapir, A.,
Tabellini, G. von Hagen, J, 1995,. Flexible Integration: Towards a More E®ec-
tive and Democratic Europe CEPR, Monitoring European Integration 6 (MEI),
London.
[10] Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrick, 1991, \Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in
the Presence of Individual-Speci¯c Uncertainty", American Economic Review, 81:
1146-1155.
[11] Inman R., and D. Rubin¯eld, 1998, Subsidiarity and the European Union, NBER
w.p. n0. 6556.
[12] Levy P.I, 1997, \A Political Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements", Amer-
ican Economic Review, 87(4), 506-519.
[13] Noury A., Hix S. and Roland G., 2003, \How to Choose the European Executive:
A Counterfactual Analysis", working paper, University of California, Berkeley.
[14] Perotti, R. 2001, \Is a Uniform Social Policy Better? Fiscal Federalism and Factor
Mobility", American Economic Review, 91 (3): 596-610.
[15] Roberts K., 1999 \Dynamic Voting in Clubs", STICERD Discussion Paper
TE/99/367.
25[16] Ruding Committee, 1992, \Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on
Company Taxation", Brussels, European Commission.
[17] Roland, G. 2000 Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms,M I T
press 2000.
[18] Stehn J., 2002, "Towards a European Constitution: Fiscal Federalism and the
Allocation of Economic Competences", Kiel Institute for World Economics, w.p.
no 1125.
[19] Tabellini, G. 2002, "Principles of Policy-making in the European Union: An Eco-
nomic Perspective" mimeo, Bocconi University, Milan.
[20] Treaty of Nice, 2002, downloadable at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice treaty/index en.htm
[21] Wrede M., 2002 \Small States, Large Unitary States and Federations", CESifo
w.p. 729.
[22] Widgr¶ en M., 2001 "Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation" CEPR
working paper, n.3042, London.
26CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
932  Myrna Wooders and Ben Zissimos, Hotelling Tax Competition, April 2003
933  Torben M. Andersen, From Excess to Shortage – Recent Developments in the Danish
Labour Market, April 2003
934  Paolo M. Panteghini and Carlo Scarpa, Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk,
April 2003
935  Henrik Jacobsen Kleven and Claus Thustrup Kreiner, The Marginal Cost of Public
Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation, April
2003
936  Klaus Adam, George W. Evans, and Seppo Honkapohja, Are Stationary Hyperinflation
Paths Learnable?, April 2003
937  Ulrich Hange, Education Policy and Mobility: Some Basic Results, May 2003
938  Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen, Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private
Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care, May 2003
939  Hendrik Jürges, Kerstin Schneider, and Felix Büchel, The Effect of Central Exit
Examinations on Student Achievement: Quasi-experimental Evidence from TIMSS
Germany, May 2003
940  Samuel Bentolila and Juan F. Jimeno, Spanish Unemployment: The End of the Wild
Ride?, May 2003
941  Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann and Anke Gerber, The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution in
Labor-Market Negotiations, May 2003
942  Ronnie Schöb, Workfare and Trade Unions: Labor Market Repercussions of Welfare
Reform, May 2003
943  Marko Köthenbürger, Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized
Leadership, May 2003
944  Albert Banal-Estañol, Inés Macho-Stadler, and Jo Seldeslachts, Mergers, Investment
Decisions and Internal Organisation, May 2003
945  Kaniska Dam and David Pérez-Castrillo, The Principal-Agent Matching Market, May
2003
946  Ronnie Schöb, The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey,
May 2003947  Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Stabilizing Competitive Cycles with Distortionary
Taxation, May 2003
948  Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad, Strategic Trade Policy and Merger Profitability, May
2003
949  Frederick van der Ploeg, Beyond the Dogma of the Fixed Book Price Agreement, May
2003
950  Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, A Microfoundation of Predator-Prey Dynamics,
May 2003
951  Burkhard Heer and Bernd Süssmuth, Cold Progression and its Effects on Income
Distribution, May 2003
952  Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Labour Demand in Germany: An Assessment of Non-
Wage Labour Costs, May 2003
953  Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller, Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group
Formation, May 2003
954  Armin Falk, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter, Living in Two Neighborhoods –
Social Interactions in the LAB, May 2003
955  Margarita Katsimi, Training, Job Security and Incentive Wages, May 2003
956  Clemens Fuest, Bernd Huber, and Jack Mintz, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A
Survey, May 2003
957  Edward Castronova, The Price of ‘Man’ and ‘Woman’: A Hedonic Pricing Model of
Avatar Attributes in a Synthetic World, June 2003
958  Laura Bottazzi and Marco Da Rin, Financing Entrepreneurial Firms in Europe: Facts,
Issues, and Research Agenda, June 2003
959  Bruno S. Frey and Matthias Benz, Being Independent is a Great Thing: Subjective
Evaluations of Self-Employment and Hierarchy, June 2003
960  Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Credit Market Imperfections in Middle Income
Countries, June 2003
961  Hans-Werner Sinn and Wolfgang Ochel, Social Union, Convergence and Migration,
June 2003
962  Michael P. Devereux, Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital, June 2003
963  Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Bjørn Volkerink, How to Measure the Tax
Burden on Labour at the Macro-Level?, June 2003964  Harry Grubert, The Tax Burden on Cross-Border Investment: Company Strategies and
Country Responses, June 2003
965  Kirk A. Collins and James B. Davies, Measuring Effective Tax Rates on Human
Capital: Methodology and an Application to Canada, June 2003
966  W. Steven Clark, Using Micro-Data to Assess Average Tax Rates, June 2003
967  Christopher Heady, The ‘Taxing Wages’ Approach to Measuring the Tax Burden on
Labour, June 2003
968  Michael P. Devereux and Alexander Klemm, Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital:
Evidence from the UK, June 2003
969  Bernhard Eckwert and Itzhak Zilcha, The Effect of Better Information on Income
Inequality, June 2003
970  Hartmut Egger and Josef Falkinger, The Role of Public Infrastructure for Firm Location
and International Outsourcing, June 2003
971  Dag Morten Dalen and Trond E. Olsen, Regulatory Competition and Multi-national
Banking, June 2003
972  Matthias Wrede, Tax Deductibility of Commuting Expenses and Residential Land Use
with more than one Center, June 2003
973  Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini, Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing
Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard, June 2003
974  Chang Woon Nam, Andrea Gebauer and Rüdiger Parsche, Is the Completion of EU
Single Market Hindered by VAT Evasion?, June 2003
975  Michael Braulke and Giacomo Corneo, Capital Taxation May Survive in Open
Economies, July 2003
976  Assar Lindbeck, An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics, July 2003
977  Henrik Jordahl and Luca Micheletto, Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal
Equity, July 2003
978  Martin D. D. Evans and Richard K. Lyons, Are Different-Currency Assets Imperfect
Substitutes?, July 2003
979  Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann and Frank Stähler, Market Entry Regulation and
International Competition, July 2003
980  Vivek Ghosal, Firm and Establishment Volatility: The Role of Sunk Costs, Profit
Uncertainty and Technological Change, July 2003
981  Christopher A. Pissarides, Unemployment in Britain: A European Success Story, July
2003982  Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes, and Wolfgang Peters, On the Frequency of
Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy, July 2003
983  Syed M. Ahsan and Panagiotis Tsigaris, Choice of Tax Base Revisited: Cash Flow vs.
Prepayment Approaches to Consumption Taxation, July 2003
984  Campbell Leith and Jim Malley, A Sectoral Analysis of Price-Setting Behavior in US
Manufacturing Industries, July 2003
985  Hyun Park and Apostolis Philippopoulos, Choosing Club Membership under Tax
Competition and Free Riding, July 2003
986  Federico Etro, Globalization and Political Geography, July 2003
987  Dan Ariely, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Analysis of Ending
Rules in Internet Auctions, July 2003
988  Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and
Domestic Policy Credibility, July 2003
989  Charles B. Blankart and Christian Kirchner, The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An
Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out, July 2003
990  M. Hasham Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Small Sample Properties of Forecasts
from Autoregressive Models under Structural Breaks, July 2003
991  Hyun Park, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Vangelis Vassilatos, On the Optimal Size of
Public Sector under Rent-Seeking competition from State Coffers, July 2003
992  Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth, Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet
Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction, July
2003
993  Pierre Salmon, The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union, July
2003
994  Louis N. Christofides and Chen Peng, Contract Duration and Indexation in a Period of
Real and Nominal Uncertainty, July 2003
995  M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann, Björn-Jakob Treutler, and Scott M. Weiner,
Macroeconomic Dynamics and Credit Risk: A Global Perspective, July 2003
996  Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco, On Enhanced Cooperation, July 2003